Washington seeks Saudi supply for vulnerable consumers

Olof Palme began his first mission in Tehran, where meetings with Iran’s leaders were planned. The visit tested whether the sides could move toward negotiations.

Duncan warned that continuing hostilities could keep Gulf exports depressed into 1981. He urged import restraint and international coordination to reduce the risk of panic buying and higher prices.

Brown recommended retaining the Saudi AWACS deployment while mutually acceptable. He also called for studying the war’s military lessons to test assumptions behind U.S. Persian Gulf strategy.

Iran’s navy, air force, and commandos attacked Iraqi naval and offshore infrastructure. The operation inflicted major losses on Iraq’s maritime capability, while showing that Iran could still...

Duncan reported resistance to binding oil-import ceilings from other consumers and Reagan’s transition team. He sought a standby arrangement for rapid action if the war worsened market pressure.

IEA ministers agreed on stock use, conservation and measures against destabilizing purchases. They set a collective demand-reduction objective but did not adopt country-specific import ceilings.

Carter’s letter to Fahd urged continued Saudi cooperation on output and pricing. It linked producer-consumer coordination to limiting economic damage while the war disrupted Iranian and Iraqi exports.

Resolution 35/144 C requested an impartial investigation of alleged chemical-weapons use with medical and technical experts, including on-site evidence collection with the countries’ consent.

Brzezinski questioned whether U.S. policy toward the war should remain tied to the hostage crisis. The coordination committee ordered a further options meeting to support Muskie’s UN diplomacy.

OPEC’s Bali conference ended with revised official price limits despite tensions between Iran and Iraq. Diplomatic reporting said the war featured prominently without stopping the conference’s basic...