Iranian forces begin Operation Morvarid in the Gulf

Hinton and Vest outlined options for a coordinated response to war-related oil shortages. These included import ceilings and emergency sharing, with different consequences for vulnerable consumers.

U.S. energy and foreign-policy ministers proposed coordinated oil allocations and import ceilings. Their memorandum anticipated a prolonged Iran–Iraq war and repairs extending beyond the fighting.

Olof Palme began his first mission in Tehran, where meetings with Iran’s leaders were planned. The visit tested whether the sides could move toward negotiations.

Duncan warned that continuing hostilities could keep Gulf exports depressed into 1981. He urged import restraint and international coordination to reduce the risk of panic buying and higher prices.

Brown recommended retaining the Saudi AWACS deployment while mutually acceptable. He also called for studying the war’s military lessons to test assumptions behind U.S. Persian Gulf strategy.

Duncan reported resistance to binding oil-import ceilings from other consumers and Reagan’s transition team. He sought a standby arrangement for rapid action if the war worsened market pressure.

State Department instructions asked for Saudi help meeting Turkish and Portuguese oil needs. The cable sought replacement supplies and price moderation while Iranian and Iraqi exports remained...

IEA ministers agreed on stock use, conservation and measures against destabilizing purchases. They set a collective demand-reduction objective but did not adopt country-specific import ceilings.

Carter’s letter to Fahd urged continued Saudi cooperation on output and pricing. It linked producer-consumer coordination to limiting economic damage while the war disrupted Iranian and Iraqi exports.

Resolution 35/144 C requested an impartial investigation of alleged chemical-weapons use with medical and technical experts, including on-site evidence collection with the countries’ consent.