Basij is placed under Revolutionary Guards command

Saunders reported that Saudi contingency planning had stalled over disputes about F-15 equipment. The briefing showed limits to security cooperation that had expanded after the invasion of Iran.

The UN announced that Iran and Iraq had agreed to a second visit by Palme, planned for 13–19 January. Agreement to receive him remained distinct from agreement on peace.

After the January 5 launch, the Iranian armored offensive was encircled and suffered heavy losses. The failure sharpened debate over military command and helped reveal the limits of early...

Washington instructed Gulf embassies to challenge oil-price increases. Its cable argued that higher prices aggravated the war’s disruption and harmed both industrial and developing economies.

Presidential Directive 63 codified U.S. Gulf security policy, including force projection, regional access and allied cooperation. The Iran-Iraq war formed part of its stated strategic setting.

A U.S. cable restated restrictions on military exports and transfers to Iran and Iraq. For Iran, access to parts for its U.S.-origin arsenal remained a central wartime problem.

After meetings with Palme, Iran reiterated that Iraqi troops must leave Iranian territory before negotiations. Occupation remained central to Tehran’s terms for peace.

Olof Palme’s third mediation mission ended without arranging a ceasefire. Iran had maintained that Iraqi troops must leave its territory before negotiations.

An Islamic mission proposed a ceasefire followed by troop withdrawals and negotiations. For Iran, the sequence raised the question of ending occupation before negotiating.

Envoys from Cuba, India, Zambia and the PLO arrived in Tehran from Baghdad. They described the mission as learning the sides’ positions, rather than presenting a finished peace plan.