Iran sets withdrawal as a precondition for talks

After the January 5 launch, the Iranian armored offensive was encircled and suffered heavy losses. The failure sharpened debate over military command and helped reveal the limits of early...

Washington instructed Gulf embassies to challenge oil-price increases. Its cable argued that higher prices aggravated the war’s disruption and harmed both industrial and developing economies.

Presidential Directive 63 codified U.S. Gulf security policy, including force projection, regional access and allied cooperation. The Iran-Iraq war formed part of its stated strategic setting.

A law ratified by the Majlis incorporated the National Basij into the Revolutionary Guards and transferred its administration, command and resources. The change structured Iran’s wartime volunteer...

A U.S. cable restated restrictions on military exports and transfers to Iran and Iraq. For Iran, access to parts for its U.S.-origin arsenal remained a central wartime problem.

Olof Palme’s third mediation mission ended without arranging a ceasefire. Iran had maintained that Iraqi troops must leave its territory before negotiations.

An Islamic mission proposed a ceasefire followed by troop withdrawals and negotiations. For Iran, the sequence raised the question of ending occupation before negotiating.

Envoys from Cuba, India, Zambia and the PLO arrived in Tehran from Baghdad. They described the mission as learning the sides’ positions, rather than presenting a finished peace plan.

A report described Iran’s Foreign Ministry calling renewed nonaligned peace suggestions encouraging, while state radio still opposed negotiating with Iraq.

William Eagleton and Tariq Aziz discussed improving U.S.–Iraqi relations and trade. The rapprochement developed while Iran was still fighting to recover occupied territory.