Christopher publicly combines neutrality with Gulf interests

In talks with Duncan, Venezuelan officials expressed willingness to help Brazil replace disrupted Iraqi oil supplies. The proposal aimed to prevent the war’s shortages from inflaming spot-market...

At a coordination meeting, Muskie warned that using the war to advance long-term U.S. military plans could provoke the Soviet Union and weaken Washington’s claimed neutrality toward Iran and Iraq.

U.S. officials agreed to sound out Saudi interest in security talks before proceeding. They separated immediate contingency discussions from a broader plan for a long-term American presence.

Dobrynin delivered a Soviet statement asking Washington to explain Saudi AWACS deployments and proposed Hormuz naval activity. Muskie defended the moves as preparations for defensive contingencies.

President Bani-Sadr visited Tabriz after bombing damaged oil installations. His public reassurance linked wartime leadership with the experience of a threatened Iranian city.

UPI reported that the Iran–Iraq war had forced three oil meetings to be postponed. Fighting between two member states obstructed the organization’s work on oil policy.

Iraq asked Indira Gandhi to initiate a solution to the war, citing India’s friendship with both belligerents. The request opened another potential channel of mediation.

Prince Fahd approved expert discussions with the United States on regional contingencies and support arrangements. The U.S. ambassador’s report stressed Saudi sensitivity over public exposure.

Gromyko told Ambassador Watson that U.S. naval deployments increased pressure on Iran. He denied Soviet arms deliveries to either belligerent and urged restraint, according to the U.S. meeting report.

Iranian ground forces attempted to halt Iraqi advances west of Dezful and along the Karkheh River. The operation reflects the difficult first phase of defense, when Iranian units were reorganizing...