đź“… 19 November 1980
U.S. energy and foreign-policy ministers proposed coordinated oil allocations and import ceilings. Their memorandum anticipated a prolonged Iran–Iraq war and repairs extending beyond the fighting.
đź“… 25 September 1980
Muskie and Gromyko discussed an immediate ceasefire and preventing outside intervention. They disagreed over the U.S. naval presence near Iran and the protection of Gulf shipping.
đź“… 3 October 1980
At a coordination meeting, Muskie warned that using the war to advance long-term U.S. military plans could provoke the Soviet Union and weaken Washington’s claimed neutrality toward Iran and Iraq.
đź“… 4 October 1980
U.S. officials agreed to sound out Saudi interest in security talks before proceeding. They separated immediate contingency discussions from a broader plan for a long-term American presence.
đź“… 4 October 1980
Dobrynin delivered a Soviet statement asking Washington to explain Saudi AWACS deployments and proposed Hormuz naval activity. Muskie defended the moves as preparations for defensive contingencies.
đź“… 16 December 1980
Brzezinski questioned whether U.S. policy toward the war should remain tied to the hostage crisis. The coordination committee ordered a further options meeting to support Muskie’s UN diplomacy.
đź“… 14 January 1981
Washington instructed Gulf embassies to challenge oil-price increases. Its cable argued that higher prices aggravated the war’s disruption and harmed both industrial and developing economies.
